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voluntary cooperation. Further experiments show that this result is robust to two important variables: experiencing Trust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010278670
voluntary cooperation. Further experiments show that this result is robust to two important variables: experiencing Trust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009149162
This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267674
interaction effects. We conduct an experiment that avoids the identification problem present in the field. Our novel design …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262127
reasonably approximate real-life decision makers? behavior. Testing this theory with field data is difficult since typically …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262147
problem. It introduces several approaches, based on both experiments and on non-experimental data, that have been proposed in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262297
when controlled experiments are not a viable option, appropriate approaches might succeed where traditional empirical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262600
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another …. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The gametheoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262760
-run persistence of observed discrimination against certain minorities in the labor market. The experiment provides some evidence … experiment, failing to generate a Self-Confirming Equilibrium driven by wrong beliefs. The strategy method provides additional …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261558
We study beliefs and choices in a repeated normal-form game. In addition to a baseline treatment with common knowledge of the game structure and feedback about choices in the previous period, we run treatments (i) without feedback about previous play, (ii) with no information about the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268780