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Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure in the Repeated Game
Normann, Hans-Theo - EconWPA - 2004
are that foreclosure is in fact a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, and it may facilitate collusion …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076896
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Collusion with Capacity Constraints over the Business Cycle
Fabra, Natalia - EconWPA - 2003
This paper investigates the effect of capacity constraints on the sustainability of collusion in markets subject to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125033
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Status Quo Effects in Bargaining: An Empirical Analysis of OPEC
Hyndman, Kyle - EconWPA - 2005
We conduct an event analysis on OPEC quota announcements to determine their impact on the stock returns in the oil industry. We find that announcements to reduce the quota are followed by positive excess returns over pre-announcement levels, announcements of no action are met with negative...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412889
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Price Wars and Collusion in the Spanish Electricity Market
Fabra, Natalia; Toro, Juan - EconWPA - 2002
\We analyze the time-series of prices in the Spanish electricity market by means of a time varying-transition-probability Markov switching model. Accounting for changes in demand and cost conditions (which reflect changes in input costs, capacity availability and hydro power), we show that the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412904
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Advantageous or Disadvantageous Semi-collusion Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry
Mukherjee, Arijit - EconWPA - 2002
This paper compares profits and consumer surplus under non-cooperation and collusion in the product market when the …-cooperation or product market collusion depends on the R\&D productivity. If the market size is sufficiently small then firms are … always better off under product market collusion. If the market size is moderate (relatively large) then the firms are better …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005412980
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Stochastic Market Sharing, Partial Communication and Collusion
Gerlach, Heiko - EconWPA - 2005
This paper analyzes the role of communication between firms in an infinitely repeated Bertrand game in which firms receive an imperfect private signal of a common value i.i.d. demand shock. It is shown that firms can use stochastic, inter-temporal market sharing as a perfect substitute for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561404
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Innovation, Licensing and Welfare
Mukherjee, Arijit - EconWPA - 2002
This paper examines how the option for licensing affects research and development (R&D) and social welfare. We find that if cost reduction from R&D is sufficiently small and there is an option of licensing, firms will do non-cooperative R&D. In absence of licensing, firms will do cooperative R&D...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076856
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Information sharing and the stability of cooperation in research joint ventures
Atallah, Gamal - EconWPA - 2000
The model studies information sharing and the stability of cooperation in cost reducing Research Joint Ventures (RJVs). In a three-stage game- theoretic framework, firms decide on participation in a RJV, information sharing along with R&D expenditures, and output. An important feature of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076871
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Screening markets for cartel detection - collusive marker in the CFD cartel-audit
Lorenz, Christian - EconWPA - 2005
Coordination Failure Diagnostics (CFD) is a model that analyses real market processes with the help of time pattern analysis and investigates whether they operate efficiently (See www.wiwi.uni-muenster.de/cfd). The CFD cartel-audit should enable the detection of cartels via characteristic market...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076883
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Plastic Clashes: Competition among Closed and Open Systems in the Credit Card Industry.
Manenti, Fabio M.; Somma, Ernesto - EconWPA - 2002
This paper analyses market competition between two different types of credit card platforms: not-for-profit associations and proprietary systems. The main focus is on the role of the interchange fee set by not-for-profit platforms. We show that when the interchange fee is set so as to maximise...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005076892