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The interaction between a sophisticated player and a fictitious player is analyzed and applied to the problem of optimal enforcement. An adaptive potential offender myopically responds to the history of past enforcement. How can a sophisticated enforcement official take advantage of this...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883235
We introduce negative externalities in the form of ill will among the players of the classic two-sided assignment game of Shapley and Shubik, by letting each player's utility be negatively correlated with the payoff of all the players in his group. The new game is very complex, but under a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011011335
Standard models of observational learning in settings of sequential choice have two key features. The first is that players make decisions by using Bayes' rule to update their beliefs about payoffs from a common prior. The second is that each agent's decision rule is common knowledge, so that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008493095
We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008475658
No abstract received.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970214
No abstract received.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970215
The paper deals with standard mathematical models for nonlinear affine control systems with two (vector-valued) inputs u (=control) and w (unknown except for a bound for the sup-norm). Interpretation of this scenario and its wide range of applications (in control and differential game theory):...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970216
Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition structures to obtain a collection of imputations rather than single imputation. Our aim is to obtain a single payoff vector, which is acceptable by all players of the game under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970217
In many share problems there is an a priori given a natural set of possible divisions to solve the sharing problem. Cooperative games related to such share sets are introduced, which may be helpful in solving share problems. Relations between properties of share sets and properties of games are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977737
Under dynamic cooperation a player may use 'irrational' acts to extort additional gains if later circumstances allow. In this article we present a condition under which even if irrational behaviors appear later in the game the concerned player would still be performing better under the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977738