Showing 1 - 10 of 17
well-known bankruptcy problem, the so-called CG-consistent solution described by the Talmud represents the nucleolus of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011011326
properties. In addition, we consider a super set of core and show that excess-sum allocation can be viewed as an imputation that … value, nucleolus, etc. in such games. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010711587
cooperative equilibria, especially as the number of players increases without bound. The core and the Shapley value are the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010883241
introduce the corresponding TU-games. The core, as well as the two friendly solutions for the corners of the market, in this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011011322
Recently it is proved that all infinite assignment games have a non-empty core. Using this fact, and a technique … are balanced via a related assignment game. By using certain core elements of infinite transportation games it can be … shown that infinite pooling games have a non-empty core. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081026
semireactive bargaining set coincides with the core on the class of symmetric TU-games. Furthermore, we give an example which … illustrates that the property 'the bargaining set coincides with the core' is not a prosperity property. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081050
that are both discontinuous and locally decreasing in money. We discuss Quinzii's theorem for the nonemptiness of the core … how this theorem of Quinzii and her second theorem on nonemptiness of the core in two-sided models are both special cases …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005081056
This paper investigates core stability of cooperative (TU) games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of … a cooperative game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to … reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009366450
Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition structures to obtain a collection of imputations rather than single imputation. Our aim is to obtain a single payoff vector, which is acceptable by all players of the game under...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004970217
In this note, we state a zero-maximum principle for core allocations, a result which was foreseen by Luenberger (1995 …). We prove a generalization of the first-zero maximum theorem of Luenberger. Roughly said, an allocation is in the core if …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004977751