well-known bankruptcy problem, the so-called CG-consistent solution described by the Talmud represents the nucleolus of the …

properties. In addition, we consider a super set of core and show that excess-sum allocation can be viewed as an imputation that … value, nucleolus, etc. in such games. …

In this note, we state a zero-maximum principle for core allocations, a result which was foreseen by Luenberger (1995 …). We prove a generalization of the first-zero maximum theorem of Luenberger. Roughly said, an allocation is in the core if …

cooperative equilibria, especially as the number of players increases without bound. The core and the Shapley value are the …

introduce the corresponding TU-games. The core, as well as the two friendly solutions for the corners of the market, in this …

This paper investigates core stability of cooperative (TU) games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of … a cooperative game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to … reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the …

Core elements (a la Aubin) of a fuzzy game can be associated with additive separable supporting functions of fuzzy … and studied. While the Aubin core of unanimity games can be empty, the generalized core of unanimity games is nonempty … are found such as the fact that the generalized core is a unique generalized stable set. …

the clan by a "dualize and extend" procedure. These procedures are also useful for relating core elements and elements of …