The aim of this paper is to analyze the interconnections between employment and unionization. We will also see how unemployment benefits drive the interplay of employment and unionization. The basic input into our model stems from cooperative game theory. Building on the Shapley value, several...

A value for games with a coalition structure is introduced, where the rules guiding cooperation among the members of the same coalition are different from the interaction rules among coalitions. In particular, players inside a coalition exhibit a greater degree of solidarity than they are...

We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not...

In this paper we introduce two related core-type solutions for games with transferable utility (TU-games) the $\mathcal{B}$-core and the $\mathcal{M}$-core. The elements of the solutions are pairs $(x, \mathcal{B}), $ where x, as usual, is a vector representing a distribution of utility and...