We formulate an overlapping generations model on optimal emissions with continuous age structure. We compare the noncooperative solution to the cooperative one and obtain fundamental differences in the optimal strategies. Also including an altruistic motive does not avoid the problem of the...

The general approach for the pricing of rainbow (or colored) options with fixed transaction costs is developed from the game theoretic point of view. The evolution of the underlying common stocks is considered in discrete time. The main result consists in the explicit calculation of the hedge...

A buyout option enhances an auction by allowing a bidder to purchase the item at a pre-specified price (instead of attempting to obtain the item by way of auction). A comparison is made between the ex ante welfare of bidders in an auction with a buyout option to a traditional auction with no...

A review of the literature on cost sharing solutions for the minimum cost spanning tree problem is proposed, with a particular focus on the folk and Kar solutions. We compare the characterizations proposed, helped by some equivalencies between sets of properties.

No abstract received.

No abstract received.

Restricting the analysis to general 2×2 coordination games, this article shows how under certain conditions, it is highly likely that individuals coordinate on a (pay-off) efficient through risk inferior convention. This contrasts with other equilibrium refinement criteria, such as risk...

The topic is two-fold. First, we prove the convexity of Owen's Airport Profit Game (inclusive of revenues and costs). As an adjunct, we characterize the class of 1-convex Airport Profit Games by equivalent properties of the corresponding cost function. Second, we classify the class of 1-convex...

The interaction between a sophisticated player and a fictitious player is analyzed and applied to the problem of optimal enforcement. An adaptive potential offender myopically responds to the history of past enforcement. How can a sophisticated enforcement official take advantage of this...

No abstract received.