Showing 1 - 10 of 16
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375574
The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which are extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155679
Let Gm,n be the class of strategic games with n players, where each player has m\geq2 pure strategies. We are interested in the structure of the set of correlated equilibria of games in Gm,n when n -\infty. As the number of equilibrium constraints grows slower than the number of pure strategy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155727
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008594148
We start with giving an axiomatic characterization of the Nash equilibrium (NE) correspondence in terms of consistency, converse consistency and one-person rationality. Then axiomatizations are given of the strong NE correspondence, the coalition-proof NE correspondence and the semi-strong NE....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755665
This paper considers the set of Lorenz-maximal imputations in the core of a balanced cooperative game as a solution concept. It is shown that the Lorenz-solution concept satisfies a number of suitable properties such as desirability, continuity and the reduced game property. Moreover, the paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598501
We consider several related set extensions of the core and the anticore of games with transferable utility. An efficient allocation is undominated if it cannot be improved, in a specific way, by sidepayments changing the allocation or the game. The set of all such allocations is called the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993368
We characterize all n-person multi-valued bargaining solutions, defined on the domain of all finite bargaining problems, and satisfying Weak Pareto Optimality (WPO), Covariance (COV), and Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). We show that these solutions are obtained by iteratively...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993398
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993402
The validity of the axiomatization of the Harsanyi solution for NTU-games by Hart (1985) is shown to depend on the regularity conditions imposed on games. Following this observation, we propose two related axiomatic characterizations, one of the symmetric egalitarian solution (Kalai and Samet,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375685