We will find 3 maximal subclasses with respect to essential, superadditive and convex games, respectively such that a game is in one subclass, so are its reduced games.

In many applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems, such as river-, polluted river- and sequencing games, the game is totally positive (i.e., all dividends are nonnegative), and there is some ordering on the set of the players. A totally positive game has a nonempty...

We provide an alternative interpretation of the Shapley value in TU games as the unique maximizer of expected Nash welfare. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This new approach enables us to construct new diagonal formulas for the Mertens value (Int J Game Theory 17:1–65, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1988</CitationRef>) and the Neyman value (Isr J Math 124:1–27, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2001</CitationRef>) on a large space of non-differentiable games....</citationref></citationref>

In Kleinberg and Weiss, Math Soc Sci 12:21–30 (<CitationRef CitationID="CR14">1986b</CitationRef>), the authors used the representation theory of the symmetric groups to characterize the space of linear and symmetric values. We call such values “membership” values, as a player’s payoff depends on the worths of the coalitions to...</citationref>

In this paper we provide an axiomatization of the Shapley value for TU-games using a fairness property. This property states that if to a game we add another game in which two players are symmetric then their payoffs change by the same amount. We show that the Shapley value is characterized by...