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Submodularity and the evolution of Walrasian behavior

Schipper, Burkhard C. - In: International Journal of Game Theory 32 (2004) 4, pp. 471-477

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178867

The Walrasian output beats the market

Morales, Antonio; Fernández-de-Córdoba, Gonzalo - In: International Journal of Game Theory 41 (2012) 1, pp. 209-212

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010993422

A characterization of stochastically stable networks

Tercieux, Olivier; Vannetelbosch, Vincent - In: International Journal of Game Theory 34 (2006) 3, pp. 351-369

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375614

Adaptive learning and p-best response sets

Durieu, J.; Solal, P.; Tercieux, O. - In: International Journal of Game Theory 40 (2011) 4, pp. 735-747

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399910

On finding curb sets in extensive games

Pruzhansky, Vitaly - In: International Journal of Game Theory 32 (2003) 2, pp. 205-210

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598513

Coordination under global random interaction and local imitation

Khan, Abhimanyu - In: International Journal of Game Theory 43 (2014) 4, pp. 721-745

Individuals are randomly matched to play a <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$2\times 2$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mn>2</mn> <mo>×</mo> <mn>2</mn> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> coordination game where the Pareto efficient and risk dominant equilibria differ. Players choose strategies by imitating the strategy of the most successful individual they observe. So, while individuals interact globally,...</equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011151106