We analyze the problem of choosing the w contestants who will win a competition within a group of n  w competitors when all jurors commonly observe who the w best contestants are, but they may be biased. We study conditions on the configuration of the jury so that it is possible to induce the...

The semigroup game is a two-person zero-sum game defined on a semigroup <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$${(S,\cdot)}$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> as follows: Players 1 and 2 choose elements <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$${x \in S}$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation> and <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$${y \in S}$$</EquationSource> </InlineEquation>, respectively, and player 1 receives a payoff f (x y) defined by a function f : S → [−1, 1]. If the semigroup is amenable...</equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></inlineequation>

The Aumann (In: Gabszewicz JJ, Richard JF, Wolsey L (eds) Economic decision making: games, econometrics and optimisation, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1990</CitationRef>) conjecture states that cheap-talk messages do not necessarily help to coordinate on efficient Nash equilibria. In an experimental test of Aumann’s conjecture,...</citationref>

This paper considers two-person non-zero-sum games on the unit square with payoff functions having a new property called poor convexity. This property describes “something between” the classical convexity and quasi-convexity. It is proved that various types of such games have Nash equilibria...

Limitations in agents’ ability to observe, measure and compute are studied. A formulation in terms of induced changes in the players’ subjective perception of the game makes it possible to study these phenomena on a common footing with objective variation in the game. We study a model where...

Pascoa (1993a) showed that the failure of the law of large numbers for a continuum of independent randomizations implies that Schmeidler's (1973) concept of a measure-valued profile function in equilibrium might not coincide with the concept of mixed strategies equilibrium of a nonatomic game....

Hillas (1990) introduced a definition of strategic stability based on perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisfies all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point out though that the proofs of the iterated dominance and forward induction...

In a market of indivisible objects where a buyer consumes at most one object, the buyer-optimal auction is a multi-item generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction. If the optimal auction is formulated as a strategic game, it is well-known that it satisfies good incentive properties, i.e.,...