Cost allocation problems arise in many contexts in economics and management science. In a typical problem that we have in mind, a decision maker must decide how to allocate the joint cost of production among several commodities using prices. Furthermore, these prices must satisfy certain...

This paper introduces a new notion of a “procedural” value for cooperative TU games. A procedural value is determined by an underlying procedure of sharing marginal contributions to coalitions formed by players joining in random order. We consider procedures under which players can only...

It is well known that in three-person transferable-utility cooperative games the bargaining set {\cal M}i1 and the core coincide for any coalition structure, provided the latter solution is not empty. In contrast, five-person totally-balanced games are discussed in the literature in which the...

We prove a theorem on the intersection of the Weber sets (Weber, 1988) of two ordered cooperative games. From this theorem several consequences are derived, the inclusion of the core in the Weber set (Weber, 1988), the fact that every convex game has a large core (Sharkey, 1982), and a discrete...

Semivalues like the Shapley value and the Banzhaf value may assign the same payoff vector to different games. It is even possible that two games attain the same outcome for all semivalues. Due to the linearity of the semivalues, this exactly occurs in case the difference of the two games is an...

We introduce the concept of a characterization set for the nucleolus of a cooperative game and develop sufficient conditions for a collection of coalitions to form a characterization set thereof. Further, we formalize Kopelowitz's method for computing the nucleolus through the notion of a...