We study the core of a non-atomic game v which is uniformly continuous with respect to the DNA-topology and continuous at the grand coalition. Such a game has a unique DNA-continuous extension ${\overline {v}}$ on the space B1 of ideal sets. We show that if the extension ${\overline {v}}$ is...

We present a classification of all stationary subgame perfect equilibria of the random proposer model for a three-person cooperative game according to the level of efficiency. The efficiency level is characterized by the number of “central” players who join all equilibrium coalitions. The...

We introduce ideas and methods from distribution theory into value theory. This new approach enables us to construct new diagonal formulas for the Mertens value (Int J Game Theory 17:1–65, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">1988</CitationRef>) and the Neyman value (Isr J Math 124:1–27, <CitationRef CitationID="CR6">2001</CitationRef>) on a large space of non-differentiable games....</citationref></citationref>

In Kleinberg and Weiss, Math Soc Sci 12:21–30 (<CitationRef CitationID="CR14">1986b</CitationRef>), the authors used the representation theory of the symmetric groups to characterize the space of linear and symmetric values. We call such values “membership” values, as a player’s payoff depends on the worths of the coalitions to...</citationref>

We will find 3 maximal subclasses with respect to essential, superadditive and convex games, respectively such that a game is in one subclass, so are its reduced games.

Three solution concepts for cooperative games with random payoffs are introduced. These are the marginal value, the dividend value and the selector value. Inspiration for their definitions comes from several equivalent formulations of the Shapley value for cooperative TU games. An example shows...