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Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations

Tijs, S. H.; Koster, M.; Molina, E.; Sprumont, Y. - In: International Journal of Game Theory 30 (2002) 4, pp. 567-599

This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We consider the weighted … adaptation of the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989). The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005375567

Negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium

Xue, Licun - In: International Journal of Game Theory 29 (2000) 3, pp. 339-357

This paper defines "negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium'', a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. It recognizes the possibility that a group of self-interested players may choose, voluntarily and without...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005755721

Inheritance of properties in communication situations

Slikker, Marco - In: International Journal of Game Theory 29 (2000) 2, pp. 241-268

account. We study inheritance of the following properties: average convexity, inclusion of the Shapley value in the core …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005598503

The consistency principle and an axiomatization of the -core

Takamiya, Koji - In: International Journal of Game Theory 30 (2001) 2, pp. 195-207

This paper examines the -core of strategic games by means of the consistency principle. I provide a new definition of a …*) under this definition of reduced games. Then I axiomatize the -core for families of strategic games with bounded payoff …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005155704

The stationary equilibrium of three-person coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: a classification

Okada, Akira - In: International Journal of Game Theory 43 (2014) 4, pp. 953-973

who join all equilibrium coalitions. The existence of a central player guarantees asymptotic efficiency. The marginal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011151105

Endogenous formation of networks for local public goods

Cho, Myeonghwan - In: International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010) 4, pp. 529-562

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673955

A generalization of the Shapley–Ichiishi result

Kuipers, Jeroen; Vermeulen, Dries; Voorneveld, Mark - In: International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010) 4, pp. 585-602

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673956

Extendability and von Neuman–Morgenstern stability of the core

Jain, Kamal; Vohra, Rakesh - In: International Journal of Game Theory 39 (2010) 4, pp. 691-697

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008673961

Constrained core solutions for totally positive games with ordered players

Brink, René; Laan, Gerard; Valeri Vasil’ev - In: International Journal of Game Theory 43 (2014) 2, pp. 351-368

the players. A totally positive game has a nonempty core. In this paper we introduce constrained core solutions for … totally positive games with ordered players which assign to every such a game a subset of the core. These solutions are based … core of a totally positive game with ordered players is a subset of the core of the game and contains the Shapley value …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010845487

An axiomatization of the inner core

Clippel, Geoffroy - In: International Journal of Game Theory 31 (2003) 4, pp. 563-569

We axiomatize the inner core in a similar way as the one proposed by Aumann (1985) in order to characterize the NTU …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010845490