We study the determinants of common European merger policy over its first 25 years, from 1990 to 2014. Using a novel dataset at the level of the relevant antitrust markets and containing all relevant merger cases notified to the European Commission, we evaluate how consistently arguments related...

Efficiency defence and merger remedies are key components in most merger control regimes. Although in many jurisdictions both the provision of efficiency-related evidence and remedy offers are at the merging firms' discretion, most previous works have only analysed them separately. This paper is...

We propose a framework to examine convergence in the jurisdictional patterns of the American FTC and the European Commission. Based on a sample of 595 merger cases scrutinized by either of these agencies in the 1995–2007 period, we estimate logit models of the probability of intervening in a...

We illustrate conditions under which a trade platform selling its own products alongside third-party sellers benefits or harms consumers. This benefits consumers by lowering prices in a suite of models: a gatekeeper platform facing a competitive fringe of sellers, when fringe sellers also have...

We examine the profitability and welfare implications of price discrimination in a multi-dimensional model. First, when firms price discriminate on one and the same dimension, uniform price lies in between discriminatory prices and price discrimination raises profits relative to uniform pricing....

Competitors often collaborate by sharing a part of value-creating activities such as technology development, product design, and distribution, which are important elements for creating product distinctiveness. Competitor collaborations have recently been regarded as crucial issues by antitrust...

I study the prospects for collusion between rival firms that share technological know-how. Two common forms of technology sharing are compared: a research joint venture (RJV) and licensing. Under licensing, firms can use the licensing fee to elicit higher levels of R&D than with an RJV. However,...

Theoretical work has suggested that contact between firms in different markets can facilitate tacit collusion. Empirical work on this link has been limited. We address the paucity of empirical evidence with a novel plant-level dataset for the cement industry during the Great Depression. We find...

We study alternative market power mitigation measures in a homogeneous goods industry where productive assets have asymmetric costs. We characterise the asset divestment by a dominant firm which achieves the greatest reduction in prices (taking the size of the divestment as given). The optimal...

Empirical models of differentiated product demand are widely used by both academics and practitioners. While these methods treat carefully the potential endogeneity of price, until recently they have assumed the number and characteristics of the products offered by firms are exogenous. This...