The experimental literature on antitrust enforcement provides robust evidence that communication plays an important role for the formation and stability of cartels. We extend these studies through a design that distinguishes between innocuous communication and communication about a cartel,...

This paper studies a dynamic Cournot duopoly in which suppliers have a limited amount of products available for two consecutive periods. We derive optimal sales strategies and analyze welfare effects with and without commitment. Under commitment, strategies do not depend on the rival's realized...

We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known to all the firms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality. Because there is only one price in a market for a homogeneous...

In this paper we examine how trade liberalization affects collusive stability in the context of multimarket interactions. The model we consider is a segmented-markets duopoly with differentiated goods in which price-setting firms pool their incentive constraints across markets to sustain their...

When commodity prices rise, wholesalers and retailers of products derived from basic commodities respond by passing along at least a portion of the price increase to consumers. In this paper we examine whether firms respond differently to positive commodity price shocks than to negative...

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces...

Markets for many commodities are characterized by imperfectly competitive production as well as substantial storage by speculators who are attracted by significant price volatility. We examine how speculative storage affects the behavior of an oligopoly producing a commodity for which demand is...

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical markets and face antitrust enforcement in different jurisdictions. We are concerned with the effectiveness of leniency programs and the benefits of international antitrust...

The arm's length principle states that the transfer price between two associated enterprises should be the price that would be paid for similar goods in similar circumstances by unrelated parties dealing at arm's length with each other. This paper examines the effect of the arm's length...

Examining a state-dependent pricing model in the presence of menu costs and dynamic duopolistic interactions, this paper claims that the assumption regarding market structure is crucial for identifying the menu costs for price changes. Prices in a dynamic duopolistic market can be more rigid...