Eric Posner (2003) has argued that (contract) law and economics has failed to produce clear policy recommendations because its theoretical results are usually inconclusive and empirical data on the parameters are usually unavailable. Legislators and courts, however, cannot wait to make decisions...

Among default remedies for breach of contract, expectation damages are believed superior to property rules such as specific performance since they allow the promisor to breach inefficient contracts when renegotiation is economically infeasible. We examine whether the promisor's ability to...

In this article, we study the choice of issuer location and regulatory competition in the European corporate debt market. We find that, in absolute terms, Germany has by far the highest outflow of debt issues, while the Netherlands, the UK, Ireland, and Luxembourg see the most inflows (in that...

We show that parties in bilateral trade can rely on the default common law breach remedy of ‘expectation damages’ to simultaneously induce first-best relationship-specific investments of both the selfish and the cooperative kind. This can be achieved by writing a contract that specifies a...

In this paper we consider situations in which the parties are in disagreement about the allocation of a certain risk, and either party could have acted ex-ante to prevent breach, to lower its probability or to insure against it (“least-cost avoidance” in tort law), but neither did so. When...

We analyze a Tullock-type takeover contest between two CEOs. To deter wasteful influence activities in shareholder optimum, the parachute compensates the (potentially) foregone earnings of the contestant whose incentives to invest in such activities are strongest. Therefore, the parachute is...

What information should courts utilize when assessing contract damages? Should they award damages that were rationally foreseeable at the ex ante stage (ex ante expected damages)? Or should they award damages at the ex post level, incorporating new information revealed after contracting (ex post...

What information should courts utilize when assessing contract damages? Should they award damages that were rationally foreseeable at the ex ante stage (ex ante expected damages)? Or should they award damages at the ex post level, incorporating new information revealed after contracting (ex post...

This article examines the effect of regulatory competition in international arbitration law on the parties' choice of the place of arbitration – in other words, the extent to which countries that revise their arbitration statutes succeed in attracting parties to hold more arbitration...