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Kojima, Fuhito - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 257-267

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986

Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism

Hashimoto, Tadashi; Hirata, Daisuke; Kesten, Onur; … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 253-277

This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684921

Learning by matching

Chen, Yi-chun; Hu, Gaoji - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 1, pp. 29-56

This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014

Gross substitutes and endowed assignment valuations

Ostrovsky, Michael; Paes Leme, Renato - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 853-865

We show that the class of preferences satisfying the Gross Substitutes condition of Kelso and Crawford (1982) is strictly larger than the class of Endowed Assignment Valuations of Hatfield and Milgrom (2005), thus resolving the open question posed by the latter paper. In particular, our result...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673201

Rank‐optimal assignments in uniform markets

Nikzad, Afshin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 1, pp. 25-55

We prove that in a market where agents rank objects independently and uniformly at random, there exists an assignment of objects to agents with a constant average rank (i.e., an average rank independent of the market size). The proof builds on techniques from random graph theory and the FKG...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806604

Family ties : school assignment with siblings

Dur, Umut Mert; Morrill, Thayer; Phan, William - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 17 (2022) 1, pp. 89-120

We introduce a generalization of the school choice problem motivated by the following observations: students are assigned to grades within schools, many students have siblings who are applying as well, and school districts commonly guarantee that siblings will attend the same school. This last...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806613

Chain stability in trading networks

Hatfield, John William; Kominers, Scott Duke; Nichifor, … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 16 (2021) 1, pp. 197-234

In a general model of trading networks with bilateral contracts, we propose a suitably adapted chain stability concept that plays the same role as pairwise stability in two-sided settings. We show that chain stability is equivalent to stability if all agents' preferences are jointly fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012415626

School choice with asymmetric information : priority design and the curse of acceptance

Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1095-1133

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309572

Lotteries in student assignment : an equivalence result

Pathak, Parag A.; Sethuraman, Jay - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 1, pp. 1-17

This paper formally examines two competing methods of conducting a lottery in assigning students to schools, motivated by the design of the centralized high school student assignment system in New York City. The main result of the paper is that a single and multiple lottery mechanism are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695102

Matching with slot-specific priorities : theory

Kominers, Scott Duke; Sönmez, Tayfun - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 11 (2016) 2, pp. 683-710

We introduce a two-sided, many-to-one matching with contracts model in which agents with unit demand match to branches … matching markets with slot-specific priorities, branches' choice functions may not satisfy the substitutability conditions … typically crucial for matching with contracts. Despite this complication, we are able to show that stable outcomes exist in the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671965

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