We define and study transparency, credibility, and reputation in a model where the central bank's characteristics are unobservable to the private sector and are inferred from the policy outcome. A low-credibility bank optimally conducts a more inflationary policy than a high-credibility bank, in...

Inflation targeting is shown to imply inflation forecast targeting: the central bank's inflation forecast becomes an explicit intermediate target. Inflation forecast targeting simplifies both implementation and monitoring of monetary policy. The weight on output stabilization determines how...

A simple and transparent framework for cost-benefit analysis of \leaning against the wind" (LAW), that is, tighter monetary policy for financial-stability purposes, is presented. LAW has obvious costs in the form of a weaker economy if no crisis occurs and possible benefits in the form of a...

This paper specifies a new convenient algorithm to construct policy projections conditional on alternative anticipated policy-rate paths in linearized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, such as Ramses, the Riksbank's main DSGE model. Such projections with anticipated...

We study the design of optimal monetary policy under uncertainty in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. We use a Markov jump-linear-quadratic (MJLQ) approach to study policy design, approximating the uncertainty by different discrete modes in a Markov chain, and by taking...

The paper argues that the reason real world fixed exchange rate regimes usually have finite bands instead of completely fixed exchange rates between realignments is that exchange rate bands, counter to the textbook result, give central banks some monetary independence, even with free...

We outline a method to provide advice on optimal monetary policy while taking policymakers' judgment into account. The method constructs Optimal Policy Projections (OPPs) by extracting the judgment terms that allow a model, such as the Federal Reserve Board's FRB/US model, to reproduce a...