cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …

We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise …-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …

problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …

-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …

In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …