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cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691082
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise …-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703024
problem, termed the multi-core, wherein an agent consents to participate in the grand coalition if she can envision a … cooperating with the grand coalition rather than operating alone. An allocation is in the multi-core if all agents consent to … participate in the grand coalition. We provide a theorem characterizing the non-emptiness of the multi-core and show that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011671885
A common real-life problem is to fairly allocate a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money among a group of agents. Fairness requires that each agent weakly prefers his consumption bundle to any other agent's bundle. In this context, fairness is incompatible with budget-balance...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674186
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287
-sided matching models. We show that the NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness properties. We then propose two new …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673364
Strategy‐proofness (SP) is a sought‐after property in social choice functions because it ensures that agents have no incentive to misrepresent their private information at both the interim and ex post stages. Group strategy‐proofness (GSP), however, is a notion that is applied to the ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806548
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy …-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694986
This paper studies bargaining outcomes in economies in which agents may be able to impose outcomes that deviate from the relevant social norms but incur costs when they do so. It characterizes bargaining outcomes that are easiest for a society to sustain as part of a social norm that everybody...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015135347
Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance by Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra (2015), have typically been based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159046