Showing 1 - 10 of 348
cannot include matchings that are not in the core. Moreover, we show that our main result is robust to many-to-one matching … stable when agents are farsighted in one-to-one matching problems. We provide the characterization of vNM farsightedly stable … sets: a set of matchings is a vNM farsightedly stable set if and only if it is a singleton subset of the core. Thus …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011691082
We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise …-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The usual core may be empty. The setwise … parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011703024
The value is a solution concept for n-person strategic games, developed by Nash, Shapley, and Harsanyi. The value of a game is an a priori evaluation of the economic worth of the position of each player, reflecting the players' strategic possibilities, including their ability to make threats...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012806287
This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with incomplete information on the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159014
In the study of farsighted coalitional behavior, a central role is played by the von Neumann–Morgenstern (1944) stable set and its modification that incorporates farsightedness. Such a modification was first proposed by Harsanyi (1974) and was recently reformulated by Ray and Vohra (2015). The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011744146
Farsighted formulations of coalitional formation, for instance by Harsanyi (1974) and Ray and Vohra (2015), have typically been based on the von Neumann-Morgenstern (1944) stable set. These farsighted stable sets use a notion of indirect dominance in which an outcome can be dominated by a chain...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012159046
We study collective choice via an endogenous agenda setting process. At each stage, a status quo is implemented unless it is replaced by a majority (winning coalition) with a new status quo outcome. The process continues until the prevailing status quo is no longer challenged. We impose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011684929
a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group …, public goods provision level, and how to share the provision costs. The FRP-Core is always nonempty in public goods economies … but does not usually achieve global efficiency. The FRP-Core has support from both cooperative and noncooperative games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996
induce hedonic games that admit core-stability. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937226
I develop a model of collaboration between tournament participants in which agents collaborate in pairs, and an endogenous structure of collaboration is represented by a weighted network. The agents are forward-looking and capable of coordination; they value collaboration with others and higher...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937299