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Damiano, Ettore; Li, Hao; Suen, Wing-chuen - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 357-393

Costly delay in negotiations can induce the negotiating parties to be more forthcoming with their information and improve the quality of the collective decision. Imposing a deadline may result in stalling, in which players at some point stop making concessions but switch back to conceding at the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690720

Stability in repeated matching markets

Liu, Ce - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 18 (2023) 4, pp. 1711-1757

This paper develops a framework for studying repeated matching markets. The model departs from the Gale …–Shapley matching model by having a fixed set of long-lived players (firms) match with a new generation of short-lived players (workers …) in every period. I define history-dependent and self-enforcing matching processes in this repeated matching environment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440097

Communication and cooperation in repeated games

Awaya, Yu; Krishna, Vijay - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 2, pp. 513-553

We study the role of communication in repeated games with private monitoring. We first show that without communication, the set of Nash equilibrium payoffs in such games is a subset of the set of ε-coarse correlated equilibrium payoffs (ε-CCE) of the underlying one-shot game. The value of ε...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022740

Strategic experimentation in queues

Cripps, Martin; Thomas, Caroline D. - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 2, pp. 647-708

We analyze the social and private learning at the symmetric equilibria of a queueing game with strategic experimentation. An infinite sequence of agents arrive at a server which processes them at an unknown rate. The number of agents served at each date is either: a geometric random variable in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012022777

Enforcing social norms : trust‐building and community enforcement

Deb, Joyee; González-Díaz, Julio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1387-1433

analyze repeated anonymous random matching games, where agents observe only their own transactions. Little is known about …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158850

Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring

Nava, Francesco; Piccione, Michele - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 1, pp. 279-312

The paper discusses community enforcement in infinitely repeated, two-action games with local interaction and uncertain monitoring. Each player interacts with and observes only a fixed set of opponents, of whom he is privately informed. The main result shows that when beliefs about the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011675195

A partial folk theorem for games with private learning

Wiseman, Thomas - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 2, pp. 217-239

The payoff matrix of a finite stage game is realized randomly, and then the stage game is repeated infinitely. The distribution over states of the world (a state corresponds to a payoff matrix) is commonly known, but players do not observe nature’s choice. Over time, they can learn the state...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690752

An anti-folk theorem for finite past equilibria in repeated games with private monitoring

Peski, Marcin - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 7 (2012) 1, pp. 25-55

We prove an anti-folk theorem for repeated games with private monitoring. We assume that the strategies have a finite past (they are measurable with respect to finite partitions of past histories), that each period players' preferences over actions are modified by smooth idiosyncratic shocks,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011690969

Robustness to incomplete information in repeated games

Chassang, Sylvain; Takahashi, Satoru - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 1, pp. 49-93

This paper extends the framework of Kajii and Morris (1997) to study the question of robustness to incomplete information in repeated games. We show that dynamically robust equilibria can be characterized using a one-shot robustness principle that extends the one-shot deviation principle. Using...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011695089

Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors

Olszewski, Wojciech; Safronov, Mikhail - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1191-1231

We study chip-strategy equilibria in two-player repeated games. Intuitively, in these equilibria players exchange favors by taking individually suboptimal actions if these actions create a "gain" for the opponent larger than the player's "loss" from taking them. In exchange, the player who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937311