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Shareholders have imperfect ontrol over the decisions of the management of a firm. We integrate a widely accepted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468940
resisting restructuring of the firm if that would jeopardize their human capital. We examine this with particular reference to … restructuring; the more so in codetermined firms. We also examine whether shareholders respond to codetermination with more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470791
Universal banking is an alternative mechanism to a stock market for risk-sharing, for providing information for guiding investment, and for contesting corporate governance. In Germany, where the stock market has historically been small, banks hold equity stakes in firms and have proxy voting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473409
In the last two decades U.S. banks have become systematically less profitable and riskier as nonbank competition has eroded the profitability of banks' traditional activities. Bank failures, insignificant from 1934, the date the Glass-Steagall Act was passed, until 1980, rose exponentially in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012474716
Firms are more complicated than standard principal-agent theory allows: firms have assets-in-place; firms endure through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount of equity that can be awarded to any one manager; and, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473055