We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) low and medium control treatmentswith 364 subjects. Each repetition employs a sample drawn from a standard subject pool ofstudents and demographics vary across samples. Our results largely conict with those of theoriginal study. We mainly...

This paper investigates market failures due to strategic delays. We test experimentally a discrete model of dynamic investment, where two privately informed agents have an option to invest at the time of their choice in the presence of waiting costs. The equilibrium outcome of ourexperimental...

We study sequential parimutuel betting markets with asymmetrically informed bettors, usingan experimental approach. In one treatment, groups of eight participants play twenty repetitionsof a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observedby other...

This paper experimentally investigates the interdependence between market competition and endogenously emerging inter-firm collaboration. We restrict attention to arrangements resulting from bilateral collaboration agreements that typically characterize real world applications in which the...

The employment relationship is characterized by incomplete contracts. Labor contracts often take the form of a fixed wage without explicit performance incentives meaning that workers have a large degree of discretion over effort levels. As a consequence, an employee’s general jobattitude...

We study interaction effects between intra-firm conflicts and interfirm competitionon a duopolistic market with seller firms employing one or more agents and imple-menting tournament incentives. We show that inter-firm competition leads to higherincentive intensity, higher efforts and output...

We revisit the economic models of social learning by assuming that individuals update theirbeliefs in a non-Bayesian way. Individuals either overweigh or underweigh (in Bayesian terms)their private information relative to the public information revealed by the decisions of othersand each...