Showing 1 - 10 of 15
The goal of this paper is to provide an overview on the Virtual Laboratory infrastructurefor online economic experiments. We summarize our experience gainedfrom performing several economic experiments on the Internet. The experimentswe have run range from electronic markets to individual...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005867014
The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter's and the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely affect the interpretation of data from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs (between-subjects and within-subjects)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281658
The existing literature acknowledges that a mismatch between the experimenter's and the subjects' models of an experimental task can adversely affect the interpretation of data from laboratory experiments. We discuss why the two common experimental designs (between-subjects and within-subjects)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008764093
Recent literature has questioned the existence of a learning foundationfor the partially cursed equilibrium. This paper closes the gap by showingthat a partially cursed equilibrium corresponds to a particular analogy-based expectation equilibrium.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866430
In line with the widely applied principle of just deserts, we assume that the severityof the penalty on a contract offender increases in the harm on the other. Whenthis principle holds, the influence of the efficiency of the agreement on the incentivesto abide by it crucially depends on whether...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866436
Can two negotiators fail to agree when both the size of the surplus and the rationalityof the negotiators are common knowledge? We show that the answer is affirmative.When the negotiators can make irrevocable commitments at a low but positive cost,the unique symmetric equilibrium entails...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866588
We consider guilt averse agents and principals and study the effects ofguilt on optimal behavior of the principal and the agent in a moral hazardmodel.The principal’s contract proposal contains a target effort in addition tothe monetary incentive scheme. By accepting the agreement, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866609
Experiments suggest that communication increases the contribution topublic goods (Ledyard, 1995). There is also evidence that, when contemplatinga lie, people trade off their private benefit from the lie with theharm it inflicts on others (Gneezy, 2005). We develop a model of bilateralpre-play...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866652
In a large scale newspaper experiment 5,132 readers of the German weekly, Die Zeit, participated in a three-person bargaining game. In our data analysis we focus on (1) the influence of age, gender, profession and the medium chosen for participation on bargaining behavior and on (2) the external...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866720
It is commonly accepted that face-to-face communication inducescooperation. The experiment disentangles communication and socialeffect (replication of Roth, 1995) and examines the components of thesocial effect with the help of unilateral communication. Results suggestthat separate processes,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866761