In this paper, we use consumption dominance curves, a tool developed by Makdissi and Wodon (2002) in order to assess the redistributive impact of electricity subsidies in Guinea. The data in the 'Enquête Intégrée de Base pour l'Évaluation de la Pauvreté (EIBEP) 2002-2003’ show that...

This paper proposes a new methodology to test for whether indirect tax reforms are pro-poor. The methodology extends stochastic dominance techniques and enables identifying tax reforms that will necessarily be deemed absolutely or relatively pro-poor by a wide spectrum of poverty analysts. The...

Housing deprivation orderings raise challenges as far as measurement is concerned. The first challengeresides in the identification of an adequate variable that characterizes housing services consumed byhouseholds. Another challenge may arise in the comparisons of housing services consumption...

We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of "self-governance". Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced....

This paper derives and justifies a procedurally fair bidding mechanism and reviews experiments that apply the mechanism to public projects pro- vision. In the experiments, not all parties benefit from provision, and the projects' costs can be negative. The experimental results indicate that the...

We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allow- ing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding...

In this paper, we propose the conception of Within-group Consumption-Dominance Curves in order to capture the impact of indirect tax reforms on poverty. Considering that the population is partitioned into many groups, which differ in needs, in health, in capability or other attributes, we...

We define and experimentally test a public provision mechanism that meets three basic ethical requirements and allows community members to influence, via monetary bids, which of several projects is implemented. For each project, participants are assigned personal values, which can be positive or...

We consider three-person envy games with a proposer, a responder, and a dummy player. In this class of games, the proposer, rather than allocating a constant pie, chooses the pie size which the responder can then accept or reject while the dummy player can only refuse his own share. While the...

Based on an axiomatically derived provision rule allowing community members to endogenously determine which, if any, public project should be provided, we perform experiments where (i) not all parties benefit from provision, and (ii) the projects' "costs" can be negative. In the tradition of...