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Miettinen, Topi - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

We consider guilt averse agents and principals and study the effects ofguilt on optimal behavior of the principal and the agent in a moral hazardmodel.The principal’s contract proposal contains a target effort in addition tothe monetary incentive scheme. By accepting the agreement, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866609

On the Co-evolution of Insider Informationand Idiosyncratic Beliefs

Gering, Thomas; Güth, Werner; Levinsky, Rene - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

. Theseidiosyncratic beliefs co-evolve with the potential insider’s inclination to acquire information.True demand expectations are not …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866567

Do prices in the unmediated call auction reflect insiderinformation? – An experimental analysis

Brünner, Tobias; Levinski, Rene - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008

information of a single informed insider,however, is less well understood. We analyse this question by presenting a simplecall … auction game where both auction prices and limit prices of uninformed tradersre°ect potential insider information. The … trading volume, uninformed traders fail to incorporate the (potential)insider information in their limit prices. We also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866435

On the Incentive Effects of Uncertainty in Monitoring Agents A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis

Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yakoov; Uske, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007

or symmetric), and piece-rate reward were manipulated factorially to test the robustness of the effects of uncertainty …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866529