Showing 1 - 10 of 89
Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining … setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281655
Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining … setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358618
We investigate the role of industry and region-specific conditions for the survival of new businesses in innovative and in other manufacturing industries. The data comprises all German manufacturing start-ups of the 1992 to 2005 period. In contrast to studies for some other countries, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435151
We investigate the role of industry and region-specific conditions for the survival of new businesses in innovative and in other manufacturing industries. The data comprises all German manufacturing start-ups of the 1992 to 2005 period. In contrast to studies for some other countries, we find...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884451
We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263854
In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281631
In three party ultimatum games the proposer can first decide whether to exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009358621
We experimentally test how acceptance thresholds react to the decision of the proposer in a three party ultimatum game to exclude one of two responders with veto power from the game. We elicit responder acceptance thresholds in case the proposer decides to exclude one of them, what increases the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051047
Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as … attempts. We experimentally compare three protocols of concession bargaining, the normal form or static one, the one where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369305
Concessions try to avoid conflict in bargaining and can finally lead to an agreement. Although they usually are seen as … attempts. We experimentally compare three protocols of concession bargaining, the normal form or static one, the one where …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884456