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Cheap talk and secret intentions in a public goods experiment
Güth, Werner; Levati, Maria Vittoria; Weiland, Torsten - 2007
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275033
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Strategic communication: An experimental investigation
Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - 2014
In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission … models differ in the information that the receiver possesses and the sender´s knowledge about these information. Lai, 2010 … & Wang, 2006, Wang et al., 2010): on the one hand experts usually give a too truthful advice, they overcommunicate. On the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369309
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Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiment
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Weiland, Torsten - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochasticlength two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talkstated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secretintention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are restricted...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866575
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Strategic Communication: An Experimental Investigation
Eckartz, Katharina; Ehses-Friedrich, Christiane - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
In this paper we attempt to compare theoretically and experimentally three models of strategic information transmission … models differ in the information that the receiver possesses and the sender's knowledge about these information. Lai, 2010 … & Wang, 2006, Wang et al., 2010): on the one hand experts usually give a too truthful advice, they overcommunicate. On the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884477
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Cheap Talk and Secret Intentions in a Public Goods Experiments
Güth, Werner; Levati, M. Vittoria; Weiland, Torsten - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090483
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Three very simple games and what it takes to solve them
Rydval, Ondřej; Ortmann, Andreas; Ostatnický, Michal - 2007
We study the nature of dominance violations in three minimalist dominance-solvable guessing games, featuring two or three players choosing among two or three strategies. We examine how subjects' reported reasoning translates into their choices and beliefs about others' choices, and how reasoning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276436
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Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: An experimental test of the absentminded driver 'paradox'
Levati, Maria Vittoria; Uhl, Matthias; Zultan, Ro'i - 2010
participants. In the other, it is imposed by randomly matching decisions with decision nodes in the information set. The results …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277338
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On the equivalence between iterated application of choice rules and common belief of applying these rules
Trost, Michael - 2014
One central issue tackled in epistemic game theory is whether for a general class of strategic games the solution generated by iterated application of a choice rule gives exactly the strategy profiles that might be realized by players who follow this choice rule and commonly believe they follow...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010500159
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An epistemic rationale for order-independence
Trost, Michael - 2012
The issue of the order-dependence of iterative deletion processes is well-known in the game theory community, and meanwhile conditions on the dominance concept underlying these processes have been detected which ensure order-independence (see e.g. the criteria of Gilboa et al., 1990 and Apt,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281613
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The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Chmura, Thorsten; Güth, Werner; Pitz, Thomas; … - 2010
We report experimental and theoretical results on the minority of three-game where three players have to choose one of two alternatives independently and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281623