Showing 1 - 10 of 99
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one's own influence on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323881
We investigate leading by example in a public goods game in scenarios with and without intergroup competition. Leading by example is implemented via a sequential decision protocol. We examine both one-shot and repeated interaction and make use of the strategy method to characterize followers'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391900
Koukoumelis et al. (2010, 2012) have shown that one-way communication enhances contributions to public goods. We investigate the effectiveness of one-way communication, when the benefits from the public good are asymmetric and the sender of a message is the main beneficiary of cooperation. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009391904
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one's own influ- ence on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010695878
I conduct an experiment to assess whether majority voting on a nonbinding sharing norm affects subsequent behavior in a … dictator game. In a baseline treatment, subjects play a one shot dictator game. In a voting treatment, subjects are first …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263797
I conduct an experiment to assess whether majority voting on a non- binding sharing norm affects subsequent behavior in … a dictator game. In a baseline treatment, subjects play a one shot dictator game. In a voting treatment, subjects are ï …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051032
Although many real bargaining situations involve more than two people, much of the theoretical and experimental research concentrates on the two player situation. We study the simplest possible extension: four people (two two-person groups) of different patience bargain with each other....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291816
higher prices. We compare two mechanisms to determine the price leader in a between-subjects design, majority voting and … lower marginal costs choose higher prices. In the majority voting treatment, participants with higher marginal costs more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323890
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323894
The key element of models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of agents. The existing axiomatizations of CSFs assume that contestants can make only one type of investment. This paper generalizes these axiomatizations to the case where each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263839