Showing 1 - 10 of 27
We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of self-governance. Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291854
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323894
Charness et al. (2007b) have shown that group membership has a strong effect on individual decisions in strategic games when group membership is salient through payoff commonality. In this comment I show that their findings also apply to non-strategic decisions, even when no outgroup exists, and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266672
Though the social choice of social institutions or social results is impossible there is, strictly speaking, no social choice individual evaluations of social institutions or results trivially are possible. Such individual evaluations can be deemed liberal either because they emphasize political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267062
In this paper, we reexamine Eliaz's results (2002) of fault tolerant implementation on one hand and we extend theorems 1 and 2 of Doghmi and Ziad (2008 a) to bounded rationality environments, on the other. We identify weak versions of the k-no veto power condition, in conjunction with unanimity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267105
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a newcomer in the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267121
We investigate experimentally whether collective choice matters for individual attitudes to ambiguity. We consider a two-urn Ellsberg experiment: one urn offers a 45% chance of winning a fixed monetary prize, the other an ambiguous chance. Participants choose either individually or in groups of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010435145
Effective communication of risks involved in the climate change discussion is crucial and despite ambitious protection policies, the possibility of irreversible consequences actually occurring can only be diminished but never ruled out completely. We present a laboratory experiment that studies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788772
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281630
We construct a simple three person trust game with one trustor and two trustees. The trustor has the possibility to either trust both trustees or none, while the trustees make their decisions either sequentially or simultaneously, depending on the treatment. When trustees play sequentially,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281662