Showing 1 - 10 of 87
The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267101
The quadratic scoring rule (QSR) is often used to guarantee an incentive compatible elicitation of subjective probabilities over events. Experimentalists have regularly not been able to ensure that subjects fully comprehend the consequences of their actions on payoffs given the rules of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008487469
A long time ago most economists would have limited themselves to stating that agreements should be individually rational and efficient and that selecting a specific agreement from that set depends on bargaining and negotiation power whatever that may be. Nowadays hardly any economist will argue...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286482
A long time ago most economists would have limited themselves to stating that agreements should be individually rational and efficient and that selecting a specific agreement from that set depends on bargaining and negotiation power whatever that may be. Nowadays hardly any economist will argue...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008852417
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a newcomer in the beginning...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267121
Many real-life applications of house allocation problems are dynamic. For example, in the case of on-campus housing for college students, each year freshmen apply to move in and graduating seniors leave. Each student stays on campus for a few years only. A student is a "newcomer" in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008512518
punishment. For this sake, we use an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in which responders can only accept …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275034
punishment. For this sake, we use an ultimatum minigame and distinguish two treatments: one in which responders can only accept …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032005
In a public goods experiment, subjects can vary over a period of stochastic length two contribution levels: one is publicly observable (their cheap talk stated intention), while the other is not seen by the others (their secret intention). When the period suddenly stops, participants are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275033
This paper provides a new way to identify conditional cooperation in a real-time version of the standard voluntary contribution mechanism. Our approach avoids most drawbacks of the traditional procedures because it relies on endogenous cycle lengths, which are defined by the number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277300