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Imperfect recall and time inconsistencies: An experimental test of the absentminded driver 'paradox'
Levati, Maria Vittoria; Uhl, Matthias; Zultan, Ro'i - 2010
Absentmindedness is a special case of imperfect recall which according to Piccione and Rubinstein (1997a) leads to time inconsistencies. Aumann, Hart and Perry (1997a) question their argument and show how dynamic inconsistencies can be resolved. The present paper explores this issue from a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010277338
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Imperfect Recall and Time Inconsistencies: An experimental test of the absentminded driver "paradox"
Levati, Vittoria M.; Uhl, Matthias; Ro'i Zultan - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
Absentmindedness is a special case of imperfect recall which according to Piccione and Rubinstein (1997a) leads to time inconsistencies. Aumann, Hart and Perry (1997a) question their argument and show how dynamic inconsistencies can be resolved. The present paper explores this issue from a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008511322
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Auctions and leaks: A theoretical and experimental investigation
Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; Zultan, Ro'i - 2017
' bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011788770
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The minority of three-game: An experimental and theoretical analysis
Chmura, Thorsten; Güth, Werner; Pitz, Thomas; … - 2010
We report experimental and theoretical results on the minority of three-game where three players have to choose one of two alternatives independently and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281623
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Allocation, externalities, and the fair division approach: an experimental study
Weiland, Torsten - 2008
We experimentally investigate four allocation mechanisms - all based on the fair division approach, with varying bid elicitation methods and price rules - in terms of their allocation efficiency, distributional effects, and regularities in individual bidding behavior. In a repeated design, an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263876
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Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and markdown bidderstheory and experiment
Kirchkamp, Oliver; Reiss, J. Philipp - 2008
We present results from a series of experiments that allow us to measure overbidding and, in particular, underbidding in first-price auctions. We investigate how the amount of underbidding depends on seemingly innocent parameters of the experimental setup. To structure our data we present and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276381
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Competition on Common Value Markets with Naive Traders– A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
Chlaß, Nadine; Güth, Werner - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007
Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866465
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Less fighting than expected: experiments with wars of attrition and all-pay auctions
Hoerisch, Hannah; Kirchkamp, Oliver - 2007
We use experiments to compare dynamic and static wars of attrition (i.e. second-price all-pay auctions) and first-price all-pay auctions. Many other studies find overbidding in first-price all-pay auctions. We can replicate this property. In wars of attrition, however, we find systematic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263871
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Bidding in common value fair division games: The winner's curse or even worse?
Becker, Alice; Brünner, Tobias - 2009
corresponding common value auction. Whereas symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibria are rather similar for both games, behavior …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267099
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Unique bid auction games
Rapoport, Amnon; Otsubo, Hironori; Kim, Bora; Stein, … - 2009
Two auction mechanisms are studied in which players compete with one another for an exogenously determined prize by … lowest (highest) bid auction game, the winner of the prize is the player who submits the lowest (highest) bid provided that …-negative cost of entry, and an option to stay out of the auction if the entry cost is deemed too high, we propose an algorithm for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267061