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Cooperation in a Risky Environment: Decisions from Experience in a Stochastic Social Dilemma
Artinger, Florian; Fleischhut, Nadine; Levati, M. Vittoria - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
cooperation is shaped by the way information about risk is presented (from description or from experience) and by differences in … lotteries with equivalent levels of risk. Cooperation rates in games vary with different levels of risk across decision … stochastic social dilemmas than in the lotteries. The findings highlight how an uncertain environment shapes cooperation and call …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010565810
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Cooperation in a risky environment: Decisions from experience in a stochastic social dilemma
Artinger, Florian; Fleischhut, Nadine; Levati, M. Vittoria - 2012
cooperation is shaped by the way information about risk is presented (from description or from experience) and by differences in … lotteries with equivalent levels of risk. Cooperation rates in games vary with different levels of risk across decision … stochastic social dilemmas than in the lotteries. The findings highlight how an uncertain environment shapes cooperation and call …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010291829
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Between-group conflict and other-regarding preferences in nested social dilemmas
Böhm, Robert; Bornstein, Gary; Koppel, Hannes - 2014
conflicts. A first experiment shows that a between-group conflict leads to within-group cooperation and particularly individuals … personal costs of within-group versus collective cooperation, supporting the weighted average social preference theory by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369323
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Between-group conflict and other-regarding preferences in nested social dilemmas
Böhm, Robert; Bornstein, Gary; Koppel, Hannes - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014
conflicts. A first experiment shows that a between-group conflict leads to within-group cooperation and particularly individuals … personal costs of within-group versus collective cooperation, supporting the weighted average social preference theory by …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010756243
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Determinants of in-group bias: group affiliation or guilt-aversion?
Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo; Regner, Tobias - 2008
In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263886
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The provision of public goods with positive group interdependencies
Güth, Werner; Sääksvuori, Lauri - 2010
efficiency. We find that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect conditional cooperation that prioritizes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267122
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The Provision of Public Goods with Positive Group Interdependencies
Güth, Werner; Sääksvuori, Lauri - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010
efficiency. We find that the observed behavior is primarily determined by an imperfect conditional cooperation that prioritizes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008472642
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Determinants of In-group Bias: Group Affiliation or Guilt-aversion?
Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008
In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090588
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Broken Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence
Leibbrandt, Andrweas; Ramalingam, Abhijit; … - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012
Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009492966
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Broken punishment networks in public goods games: Experimental evidence
Leibbrandt, Andreas; Ramalingam, Abhijit; Sääksvuori, … - 2012
Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctions. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions where punishment opportunities are restricted to agents...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281653