Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiring a company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition of both, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higher prices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiringa company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition ofboth, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higherprices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

Theoretically and experimentally, we generalize the analysis of acquiring a company (Samuelson and Bazerman 1985) by allowing for competition of both, buyers and sellers. Naivety of both is related to the idea that higher prices exclude worse qualities. While competition of naive buyers...

Empirical research has shown tremendous productivity differences, even within narrowly defined industries. A great host of studies is explainsing this productivity disparity by factors such as idiosyncratic technology shocks, input price differences, management skills, or international trade....

Empirical research has shown tremendous productivity differences, even within narrowly defined industries. A great host of studies is explainsing this productivity disparity by factors such as idiosyncratic technology shocks, input price differences, management skills, or international trade....

The paper aims to investigate the diffusion process of two competing innovative technologies in the health care sector. Novelties in cardiovascular surgery will serve as an example. Using a rather simple modeling approach for the decisions of adopters and suppliers we simulate the evolution of a...

The paper aims to investigate the diffusion process of two competing innovative technologies in the health care sector. Novelties in cardiovascular surgery will serve as an example. Using a rather simple modeling approach for the ecisions of adopters and suppliers we simulate the evolution of a...

We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers can adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader then clears the market by...

We present a model of price leadership on homogeneous product markets where the price leader is selected endogenously. The price leader sets and guarantees a sales price to which followers can adjust according to their individual supply functions. The price leader then clears the market by...

We compare the performance of liability rules for managing environmental disasters when third parties are harmed and cannot always be compensated. A firm can invest in safety to reduce the likelihood of accidents. The firm's investment is unobservable to authorities. Externality and asymmetric...