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We propose a meta-heuristic approach for solving nonlinear dynamic tracking games. In contrast to more "traditional" methods based on linear-quadratic (LQ) techniques, this derivative-free method is very flexible (e.g. to introduce inequality constraints). The meta-heuristic is applied to a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011298509
The provision of public goods regularly embodies interrelated spheres of influence on multiple scales. This article examines the nature of human behavior in a multilevel social dilemma game with positive provision externalities to local and global scales. We report experimental results showing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009487801
Envy is often the cause of mutually harmful outcomes. We experimentally study the impact of envy in a bargaining setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the size of the pie to be shared with a responder, whose share...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009374671
A long time ago most economists would have limited themselves to stating that agreements should be individually rational and efficient and that selecting a specific agreement from that set depends on bargaining and negotiation power whatever that may be. Nowadays hardly any economist will argue...
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In the experimental scenario several agents repeatedly invest in n (n2) state-specific assets. The evolutionarily stable and equilibrium (Blume and Easley, 1992) portfolio for this situation requires to distribute funds according to the constant probabilities of the various states. The different...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003796833
Agents compete to acquire a limited economic opportunity of uncertain profitability. Each agent decides how much he acquires public signals before making investment under fear of preemption. I show that equilibria have various levels of efficiency under mild competition. The effect of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747610