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On the malleability of fairness ideals : order effects in partial and impartial allocation tasks
Dengler-Roscher, Kathrin; Montinari, Natalia; … - 2015
How malleable are peopleś fairness ideals? Although fairness is an oft-invoked concept in allocation situations, it is still unclear whether and to what extent peopleś allocations reflect their fairness ideals. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether peopleś fairness ideals vary...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279775
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Reciprocity under moral wiggle room : is it a preference or a constraint?
Regner, Tobias - 2016
provided. Our binary trust game closely follows their design. Only a preceding stage (safe outside option vs. enter the game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576929
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Intentions and consequences : an experimental investigation of trust and reciprocity determinants
Güth, Werner; Mugera, Harriet; Musau, Andrew; Ploner, … - 2012
We experimentally manipulate the efficiency of trust and reciprocity in a modified Investment Game. The aim of our … manipulation is to test whether reciprocity is mainly affected by payoff consequences of trust or by intentions underlying it. We … find that intentions matter and that consequences have an asymmetric impact: trustees reward trust more when trust is more …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567106
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Context and interpretation in laboratory experiments : the case of reciprocity
Levati, Maria Vittoria; Miettinen, Topi; Rai, Birendra K. - 2010
the literature on social preferences in general and reciprocity in particular. -- Experimental design ; Context ; Trust …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008759487
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Testing the framework of other-regarding preferences
Levati, M. Vittoria; Nicholas, Aaron; Rai, Birendra - 2011
trust games. Positively and/or negatively other-regarding subjects are significantly less likely to report single …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009306937
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Revealed notions of distributive justice II : experimental evidence
Becker, Nicole; Häger, Kirsten; Heufer, Jan - 2013
We report the results of a combination of a dictator experiment with either a "social planner" or a "veil of ignorance" experiment. The experimental design and the analysis of the data are based on the theoretical framework proposed in the companion paper by Becker, Häger, and Heufer (BHH,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010370990
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Revealed notions of distributive justice I : theory
Becker, Nicole; Häger, Kirsten; Heufer, Jan - 2013
We provide a framework to decompose preferences into a notion of distributive justice and a selfishness part and to recover individual notions of distributive justice from data collected in appropriately designed experiments. "Dictator games" with varying transfer rates used in Andreoni and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010370991
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Giving in dictator games : experimenter demand effect or preference over the rules of the game?
Chlaß, Nadine; Moffatt, Peter G. - 2012
Traditionally, giving in dictator games was assumed to signal preferences over others' payoffs. To date, several studies find that dictator game giving breaks down under conditions designed to increase dictators' anonymity or if an option to take money obscures the purpose of the task. Giving is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009569631
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Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents
Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Angelova, Vera - 2010
One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944228
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Exploring the effects of unequal and secretive pay
Fischer, Sven; Steiger, Eva-Maria - 2009
We experimentally test whether intentional and observable discriminatory pay of symmetric agents in the Winter (2004) game causes low paid agents to reduce effort. We control for intentionality of wages by either allowing a principal to determine wages or by implementing a random process. Our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003924261