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Does procedural fairness crowd out other-regarding concerns? A bidding experiment
Güth, Werner; Levati, Vittoria M.; Ploner, Matteo - 2010
Bidding rules that guarantee procedural fairness may induce more equilibrium bidding and moderate other-regarding concerns. In our experiment, we assume commonly known true values and only two bidders to implement a best-case scenario for other-regarding concerns. The two-by-two factorial design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008689003
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Is regulation by milestones efficiency enhancing? : an experimental study of environmental protection
Freytag, Andreas; Güth, Werner; Koppel, Hannes; … - 2010
Viewing individual contributions as investments in emission reduction we rely on the familiar linear public goods-game to set global reduction targets which, if missed, imply that all payoffs are destroyed with a certain probability. Regulation by milestones does not only impose a final...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008747599
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Auctions and leaks : a theoretical and experimental investigation
Fischer, Sven; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; Zultan, Ro'i - 2017 - Revised Version of JERP 2014-027
’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011738563
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Auctions and leaks : a theoretical and experimental investigation
Fischer, Sven Heiko; Güth, Werner; Kaplan, Todd R.; … - 2014 - This version: November 5, 2014
first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first …-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433909
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Allocation, externalities, and the fair division approach : an experimental study
Weiland, Torsten (contributor) - 2008
. -- Allocation ; auction ; fair division ; externalities ; experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003723091
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Trust in generosity : an experiment of the repeated Yes-No game
Güth, Werner; Otsubo, Hironori - 2014
This paper reports results of a 100-round Yes-No game experiment conducted under the random matching protocol. In contrast to ultimatum bargaining, the responder in the Yes-No game decides whether to accept without knowing the proposer’s offer. Although both games have the same solution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010433915
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A fair share : burden-sharing preferences in the United States and China
Carlsson, Frederik; Kataria, Mitesh; Krupnick, Alan J.; … - 2010
Using a choice experiment, we investigated preferences for distributing the economic burden of decreasing CO2 emissions in the two largest CO2-emitting countries: the United States and China. We asked respondents about their preferences for four burden-sharing rules to reduce CO2 emissions...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688997
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Bidding in common value fair division games : the winner’s curse or even worse?
Becker, Alice; Brünner, Tobias - 2009
corresponding common value auction. Whereas symmetric risk neutral Nash equilibria are rather similar for both games, behavior … the fair division game separates into extreme overand underbidding. -- common value auction ; winner’s curse ; fair …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003905741
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Fear of being left alone drives inefficient exit from partnerships : an experiment
Crosetto, Paolo; Gaudeul, Alexia; Riener, Gerhard - 2014
We explore in an experiment what leads to the breakdown of partnerships. Subjects are assigned a partner and participate in a repeated public good game with stochastic outcomes. They can choose each period between staying in the public project or working on their own. There is excessive exit as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340746
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Short- and long-run effects of external interventions on trust
Asanov, Igor A.; Vannuccini, Simone - 2015
We experimentally analyze the effects of external interventions such as subsidy and targeting on investment decisions during the intervention and after. We employ a multi-period version of the trust (investment) game (Berg et al., 1995) introducing either the monetary incentives for contribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339172