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For our experiment on corruption, we designed a coordination game to model the influence of risk attitudes, beliefs … reduces corruption. -- Corruption ; game theory ; experiment ; risk attitude ; beliefs …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567098
provision of globally important public goods like the global climate. -- Experiment ; Groups ; Public good ; Spillover Game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009487801
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one’s own influence on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792169
determine, via their bids, which of four alternative public projects to implement. Previous experiments with positive cost … projects have demonstrated that the mechanism is efficiency enhancing. Our experiment tests whether the mechanism remains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009784119
goods experiments ; Voluntary contributions ; Risk ; Uncertainty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003887174
destructive nature of intergroup conflicts. -- Communication ; Conflict ; Experiment ; Rent-seeking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008688486
public goods with positive externalities. -- Public good ; experiment ; groups ; Spillover Game ; social dilemma …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003952498
mechanisms. We confirm the robustness of this result in the presence of income heterogeneity. -- Public goods experiment ; Cheap …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008779942
. This study is based on a real effort-task experiment, where the exogenous influence is twofold: it comes either as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008824133
This article defines in a precise manner three different mechanisms to achieve impartiality in distributive justice and studies them experimentally. We consider a first-person procedure, the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and two third-party procedures, the impartial spectator and the ideal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980535