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morally bad instead of good. Due to this asymmetry, people punish the perpetrators of negative externalities more severely … not only moral considerations but also the information setting of perpetrators of externalities are taken into account by … ; externalities ; punishment ; praise ; moral bias …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980539
Willingness to take risk depends on whether the risk affects others as well as oneself and on how the risk affects oneś position vis-á-vis others. Taking a bet can improve oneś position relative to others or threaten it. We present an experiment that explores individual attitudes to lotteries...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009784058
Social lotteries are lotteries that are played along with someone else. The experimental literature indicates that risk attitudes depend on how one’s situation in the safe alternative compares to that of a peer. Evaluation of the risky alternative also depends on whether the lottery gives...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011295782
Unanimous voting as the fundamental procedural source of political legitimacy grants veto power to each individual. We present an axiomatic characterization of a class of bidding processes to spell out the underlying egalitarian values for collective projects of a "productive state". At heart of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008990916
We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of "self-governance". Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009686468
A group of actors, individuals or firms, can engage in collectively providing projects which may be costly or generating revenues and which may benefit some and harm others. Based on requirements of procedural fairness (Güth and Kliemt, 2013), we derive a bidding mechanism determining...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009736802
Almost all international environmental agreements include a minimum participation rule. Under such a rule an agreement becomes legally binding if and only if a certain threshold in terms of membership or contribution is reached. We analyze a cartel game with open membership and heterogeneous...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003883288
We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one’s own influence on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009792169
This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009271149
During the last three decades the ascent of behavioral economics clearly helped to bring down artificial disciplinary boundaries between psychology and economics. Noting that behavioral economics seems still under the spell of the rational choice tradition and, indirectly, of behaviorism we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003809939