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Explaining gender differences in competitiveness : gender-task stereotypes
Große, Niels D.; Riener, Gerhard - 2010
able to explain a large part of the under-representation of women in tournament like environments. We conduct an experiment …-sex groups given different incentive schemes. Furthermore, we report the results of a framed field experiment, where we explore a … our interpretation. -- Competition, piece rate ; revenue sharing ; gender-task stereotype ; experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944236
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What drives motivated agents? : the "right" mission or sharing it with the principal
Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - 2015
Motivated agents are characterized by increasing their effort if their work generates not only a monetary return for them but also a benefit for a mission they support. While their motivation may stem from working for their preferred (i.e., the `right') mission, it may also be the principal's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401176
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Productivity in contests : organizational culture and personality effects
Andersson, Ola; Huysentruyt, Marieke; Miettinen, Topi; … - 2010
against each other. In a computerized lab experiment with minimal group design, we prime subjects to two alternative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003989034
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What renders financial advisors less treacherous? : on commissions and reciprocity
Angelova, Vera - 2010
An advisor is supposed to recommend a financial product in the best interest of her client. However, the best product for the client may not always be the product yielding the highest commission (paid by product providers) to the advisor. Do advisors nevertheless provide truthful advice? If not,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980494
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Hidden costs of control : three repetitions and an extension
Ploner, Matteo; Schmelz, Katrin; Ziegelmeyer, Anthony - 2010
We report three repetitions of Falk and Kosfeld's (2006) C5 and C10 treatments whose results largely conflict with those of the original study. We mainly observe hidden costs of control of low magnitude which lead to low-trust principal-agent relationships. We also report an extension where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003943978
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Corporate social responsibility in the work place : experimental evidence on CSR from a gift-exchange game
Koppel, Hannes; Regner, Tobias - 2011
We analyze the effect of investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) on workers' motivation. In our experiment … into CSR is high. -- Corporate Social Responsibility ; gift-exchange game ; experiment ; labor market ; incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230365
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Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? : an experimental sender-receiver game
Angelova, Vera; Regner, Tobias - 2012
The market for retail financial products (e.g. investment funds or insurances) is marred by information asymmetries. Clients are not well informed about the quality of these products. They have to rely on the recommendations of advisors. Incentives of advisors and clients may not be aligned,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009515366
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You are who your friends are : an experiment on trust and homophily in friendship networks
Kataria, Mitesh; Winter, Fabian - 2013
derived hypotheses in a controlled laboratory environment. In the experiment, two trustees sequentially play a trust game with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252394
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Charitable giving among females and males : an empirical test of the competitive altruism hypothesis
Böhm, Robert; Regner, Tobias - 2012
We conduct a real-effort task experiment where subjects' performance translates into a donation to a charity. In a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567083
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Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents
Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Angelova, Vera - 2010
One-shot interaction and repeated interaction often co-exist in the real world. We study possible behavioral effects of this co-existence in a principal-agent setting, in which a principal simultaneously employs a permanent and a temporary agent. Our experimental results indicate that there is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944228