’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …

first movers bids. There is a unique equilibrium in the first-price auction and multiple equilibria in the second …-price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. We experimentally find that in the first …-price auction, leaks benefit second movers but harm first movers and sellers. Low to medium probabilities of leak eliminate the …

border case. We also review some experiments on strategic games illustrating and partly supporting our theoretical approach …

)bounded rationality ; (non-)cooperative game theory ; bargaining and negotiation (theory and experiments) …

easy. In our stochastic (alternating offer) bargaining experiment, there is a certain first-period pie and a known finite …