When banks choose similar investment strategies the financial system becomes vulnerable to common shocks. We model a simple financial system in which banks decide about their investment strategy based on a private belief about the state of the world and a social belief formed from observing the...

Interconnections among financial institutions create potential channels for contagion and amplification of shocks to the financial system. We estimate the extent to which interconnections increase expected losses and defaults under a wide range of shock distributions. In contrast to most work on...

We present new evidence on the structure of interbank connections across key markets: derivatives, marketable securities, repo, unsecured lending and secured lending. Taken together, these markets comprise two networks: a network of interbank exposures and a network of interbank funding. Network...

In this paper, we focus on the interconnectedness of banks and the price they pay for liquidity. We assess how the concentration of credit relationships and the position of a bank in the network topology of the system influence the bank’s ability to meet liquidity demand. We use quarterly data...

Foreign currency loans represent an important feature of recent financial developments in CEECs. This might pose a serious challenge for macroeconomic stability. Against this background, we study the determinants of foreign currency loans of households, using data on the behavior of households...

Banking regulations often differ between countries: Some regulators require banks to document their evaluation of firms’ creditworthiness, which determines the banks’ choice of lending technology. In a theoretical model, we study how differences in regulation influence competition between...

We investigate whether or not market discipline on banking firms changed after the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (DFA) of 2010. If market discipline is improved, we should see a lower discount for size on yield spreads, particularly for banks identified as...

In this paper we study systemic risk for the US and Europe. We show that banks’ exposures to common risk factors are crucial for systemic risk. We come to this conclusion by first showing that relations between US and European banks are smaller than within each region. We then show that...

Contingent Convertibles (“CoCos”) are contingent capital instruments which convert into shares, or have a principal write down, if a trigger event takes place. CoCos exhibit the undesirable so-called death-spiral effect: by actively hedging the equity risk, investors can (unintentionally)...

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects...