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Shubik, Martin - In: Kyklos : international review for social sciences 6 (1953) 1, pp. 21-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002826296

Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts

Benson, Brett V.; Meirowitz, Adam; Ramsay, Kristopher W. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (2014) 2, pp. 307-335

Do military alliances foster aggressive behavior in allies to the point of undermining the security goal of the alliance? Like others, we find that alliance commitments may cause moral hazard because allies do not fully internalize the costs of actions that can lead to war. But unlike others, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010802137

Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining

Butler, Christopher K. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007) 2, pp. 227-250

Despite many applications of prospect theory's concepts to explain political and strategic phenomena, formal analyses … of strategic problems using prospect theory are rare. Using Fearon's model of bargaining, Tversky and Kahneman's value … expected value and prospect theory when applied to strategic interaction. Critically important to this demonstration is an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010802270

The Domestic Sources of Donor Credibility

Eng, Man Yan; Urpelainen, Johannes - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (2015) 2, pp. 283-309

Donors often condition foreign aid to recipients on policy adjustments. How do domestic interest groups influence a donorâ€™s ability to credibly commit to implementing threats and promises? In our model, domestic interest groups in the donor country can mobilize to support the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161093