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The role of game theory in economics

Shubik, Martin - In: Kyklos : international review for social sciences 6 (1953) 1, pp. 21-34

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002826296

Ein Spiel gegen die Natur

Schelbert-Syfrig, Heidi - In: Kyklos : international review for social sciences 22 (1969) 1, pp. 62-68

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002774992

Economics and the theory of games

Morgenstern, Oskar - In: Kyklos : international review for social sciences 3 (1949) 4, pp. 294-308

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002514097

Oligopoly and game theory

Weintraub, Sidney - In: Kyklos : international review for social sciences 13 (1960) 3, pp. 400-406

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002976311

Commitment Problems or Bidding Wars? Rebel Fragmentation as Peace Building

Driscoll, Jesse - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (2012) 1, pp. 118-149

After highly fragmented civil wars, order is often secured through the selective co-optation of rebel field commanders and atomized insurgents. This paper presents a formal model of civil war settlement as a coalition formation game between various regime and rebel factions. This approach...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010553085

Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games

Jacobson, Daniel; Kaplan, Edward H. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007) 5, pp. 772-792

This article develops sequential game models for key operational terrorist (how often to attack) and government (how often to execute targeted killings) decisions taken during a (counter-) terror campaign such as the second intifada. Key results include the following: The government initiates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801818

Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts

Benson, Brett V.; Meirowitz, Adam; Ramsay, Kristopher W. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (2014) 2, pp. 307-335

Do military alliances foster aggressive behavior in allies to the point of undermining the security goal of the alliance? Like others, we find that alliance commitments may cause moral hazard because allies do not fully internalize the costs of actions that can lead to war. But unlike others, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010802137

Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining

Butler, Christopher K. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007) 2, pp. 227-250

Despite many applications of prospect theory's concepts to explain political and strategic phenomena, formal analyses … of strategic problems using prospect theory are rare. Using Fearon's model of bargaining, Tversky and Kahneman's value … expected value and prospect theory when applied to strategic interaction. Critically important to this demonstration is an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010802270

Terrorism and Policy: Introduction

Sandier, Todd - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2010) 2, pp. 203-213

This article sets the stage for the special issue by indicating the current focus in the literature on applying analytical tools to enlighten policy makers in the practice of counterterrorism in the post-9/1 I era. In particular, the article briefly indicates the main areas of recent work. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004493

Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression

Pierskalla, Jan Henryk - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2010) 1, pp. 117-145

The theoretical literature on government repression has mostly taken a choice theoretic perspective, wherein either the protest group optimally chooses a protest tactic in response to government behavior or the government optimally chooses a repression strategy. This approach is insufficient for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004497