Randall Stone's critique of theory of moves (TOM) is motivated by a desire to purge game theory of TOM's alleged “backsliding†and restore its superior orthodoxy. But Stone's indictment is marred by serious misunderstandings of TOM and unfortunate misconceptions about what constitutes...

Game-theoretic models of deterrence and escalation, based on Chicken and Prisoners' Dilemma, are developed in which two players can initially choose any level of preemption in a crisis (Deterrence Game) or escalation in an arms race (Deescalation Game). The greater this level, the more likely an...

Arms-control inspection is modeled by two games, one played simultaneously and one sequentially, between an inspector (O) and an inspectee (E). In each game, E may choose to comply with or violate an arms-control agreement and O may choose to inspect, or not, for a possible violation by E....

Three-party negotiations are analyzed in which the players are able not only to rank alternatives but also have a preference for impasse. In a dynamic model, players progressively invoke fallback positions to try to prevent inferior outcomes from being implemented in a game of incomplete...

The relationship between Newcomb's problem, which involves an apparent paradox of prediction, and Prisoners' Dilemma is explicated. After describing a resolution to Newcomb's problem, due to John A. Ferejohn, that renders the two contradictory principles of choice in Newcomb's problem (dominance...