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Sandier, Todd - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2010) 2, pp. 203-213

This article sets the stage for the special issue by indicating the current focus in the literature on applying analytical tools to enlighten policy makers in the practice of counterterrorism in the post-9/1 I era. In particular, the article briefly indicates the main areas of recent work. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004493

Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression

Pierskalla, Jan Henryk - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2010) 1, pp. 117-145

The theoretical literature on government repression has mostly taken a choice theoretic perspective, wherein either the protest group optimally chooses a protest tactic in response to government behavior or the government optimally chooses a repression strategy. This approach is insufficient for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004497

Inducing Cooperative Behavior among Proselfs versus Prosocials: The Moderating Role of Incentives and Trust

Boone, Christophe; Declerck, Carolyn; Kiyonari, Toko - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 54 (2010) 5, pp. 799-824

This study investigates how an individualâ€™s social value orientation (SVO) interacts with explicit cooperative incentives on one hand, and intrinsic and extraneously induced trust on the other hand, to affect cooperative behavior. In three experiments, subjects (n = 322) played a one-shot...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009004502

Suicide Bombings and Targeted Killings in (Counter-) Terror Games

Jacobson, Daniel; Kaplan, Edward H. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007) 5, pp. 772-792

This article develops sequential game models for key operational terrorist (how often to attack) and government (how often to execute targeted killings) decisions taken during a (counter-) terror campaign such as the second intifada. Key results include the following: The government initiates...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801818

Inducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance Contracts

Benson, Brett V.; Meirowitz, Adam; Ramsay, Kristopher W. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (2014) 2, pp. 307-335

Do military alliances foster aggressive behavior in allies to the point of undermining the security goal of the alliance? Like others, we find that alliance commitments may cause moral hazard because allies do not fully internalize the costs of actions that can lead to war. But unlike others, we...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010802137

Prospect Theory and Coercive Bargaining

Butler, Christopher K. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 51 (2007) 2, pp. 227-250

Despite many applications of prospect theory's concepts to explain political and strategic phenomena, formal analyses … of strategic problems using prospect theory are rare. Using Fearon's model of bargaining, Tversky and Kahneman's value … expected value and prospect theory when applied to strategic interaction. Critically important to this demonstration is an …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010802270

The Domestic Sources of Donor Credibility

Eng, Man Yan; Urpelainen, Johannes - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (2015) 2, pp. 283-309

Donors often condition foreign aid to recipients on policy adjustments. How do domestic interest groups influence a donorâ€™s ability to credibly commit to implementing threats and promises? In our model, domestic interest groups in the donor country can mobilize to support the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011161093

Same Game, New Tricks

Pelc, Andrzej; Pelc, Krzysztof J. - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (2009) 5, pp. 774-793

The aim of this article is to distinguish between strategies in the Iterated Prisonerâ€™s Dilemma on the basis of their relative performance in a given population set. We first define a natural order on such strategies that disregards isolated disturbances, by using the limit of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011136117

Negative Reciprocity in an Environment of Violent Conflict

Schubert, Manuel; Lambsdorff, Johann Graf - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 58 (2014) 4, pp. 539-563

How is negative reciprocity cultivated in an environment of violent conflict? This study investigates how students in the West Bank react to unfair proposals in an ultimatum game. Proposals submitted with Hebrew as compared to Arab handwriting are rejected more often. Israelis must offer 15...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011136285

Linguistic Fuzzy-Logic Game Theory

Arfi, Badredine - In: Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (2006) 1, pp. 28-57

The author develops a new game-theoretic approach, anchored not in Boolean two-valued logic but instead in linguistic fuzzy logic. The latter is characterized by two key features. First, the truth values of logical propositions span a set of linguistic terms such as true, very true, almost...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011136292