In a two-player proactive response game the level of proactive activity and the choice of terrorist target is endogenized. The targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of event—normal or spectacular. Unlike previous...

The concept of networks has become synonymous with terrorism in recent years. Despite the abundance of material engaging the concept of terrorist networks, there is a paucity of research that applies analytic network methods to the empirical study of observed data. This article fills that void...

Poverty is often identified as a determinant of terrorist group participation, but existing research reveals mixed support for this relationship. Some studies find that macroeconomic decline is associated with increased production of terrorists, but micro-level research suggests terrorists have...

This article establishes the prevalence of deterrence over preemption when targeted governments can choose between either policies or employ both. There is a similar proclivity to favor defensive counter-terrorist measures over proactive policies. Unfortunately, this predisposition results in an...

This article develops sequential game models for key operational terrorist (how often to attack) and government (how often to execute targeted killings) decisions taken during a (counter-) terror campaign such as the second intifada. Key results include the following: The government initiates...

The authors model a terrorist organization’s choice over the scale and planning horizon of terror attacks and the consequences for the organization’s evolution. The organization can engage in short-term attacks planned and executed in a single period, characterized by a low fixed...