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One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011136132
The emergence and institutionalization of cooperation in sizable groups without reciprocity receives considerable … toward global cooperation, but with severe losses of cultural diversity and tolerance. Cooperation in such regimes also … proves to be vulnerable to defection. Between, there is a space displaying relatively stable and widespread cooperation with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011136185
Surprisingly high levels of within-group cooperation are observed in conflict situations. Experiments confirm that … external threats lead to higher cooperation. The psychological literature suggests proximate explanations in the form of group … which cooperation is a rational response to an external threat. In the model, groups vary in their willingness to help each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011136211
cooperation through two mechanisms. First, groups differ in the benefits they receive from cooperation. This affects which groups … can commit to cooperate. Second, a nation may selectively withhold cooperation from one group to influence the domestic … under different institutional rules into a prisoner’s dilemma model of international cooperation, the theory generates …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011136269
cooperative arrangements (i.e., they refuse any future cooperation as long as the responsible incumbent remains in office), then … citizens remove leaders caught cheating, providing the cost of doing so is less than the value of the cooperation foregone. For … leaders can credibly commit to deeper and more reliable cooperation. The authors derive hypotheses about the patterns of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801260
In this article, the authors measure experienced guilt in a prisoner's-dilemma experiment with preplay communication. The authors find that feelings of guilt only arise in the case of unilateral defection and that they are stronger when players have mutually agreed to cooperate. The authors also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801428
In public-good provision, privileged groups enjoy the advantage that some of their members find it optimal to supply a positive amount of the public good. However, the inherent asymmetric nature of these groups may make the enforcement of cooperative behavior through informal sanctioning harder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801517
The present experiment introduces a modification of the iterated prisoner's dilemma (PD). In contrast to classical dilemma situations with only one interaction partner, participants (N = 120) interacted with five fictitious interaction partners within one game, either in a random order (change...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801598
Previous studies have not established a consistent link between regime type and alliance formation, despite the relevance of the decision to ally in a number of arguments about regime type and alliance behavior. The inconsistency in these findings turns largely on choice of research design and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801690
Terrorist organizations do not operate in isolation. Instead, they forge alliances with one another, which generate a tight network of intergroup relationships. We argue that these relationships serve to increase group capacity, manifesting itself in the ability of a group to conduct deadly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010801809