We propose a novel methodology for identification of first-price auctions, when bidders’ private valuations are independent conditional on one-dimensional unobserved heterogeneity. We extend the existing literature (Li and Vuong, 1998; Krasnokutskaya, 2011) by allowing the unobserved heterogeneity...

In this paper, we consider nonparametric identification and estimation of first-price auction models when N*, the number of potential bidders, is unknown to the researcher, but observed by bidders. Exploiting results from the recent econometric literature on models with misclassification error,...

We consider the identification of a Markov process {Wt,Xt∗} when only {Wt} is observed. In structural dynamic models, Wt includes the choice variables and observed state variables of an optimizing agent, while Xt∗ denotes time-varying serially correlated unobserved state variables (or...

This paper provides a general solution to the problem of identification and estimation of nonlinear models with misclassification error in a general discrete explanatory variable using instrumental variables. The misclassification error is allowed to be correlated with all the explanatory...

This paper considers nonparametric identification of nonlinear dynamic models for panel data with unobserved covariates. Including such unobserved covariates may control for both the individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of the explanatory variables. Without specifying...

This paper considers the widely admitted ill-posed inverse problem for measurement error models: estimating the distribution of a latent variable X∗ from an observed sample of X, a contaminated measurement of X∗. We show that the inverse problem is well-posed for self-reporting data under...

This paper proposes closed-form estimators for nonparametric regressions using two measurements with non-classical errors. One (administrative) measurement has location-/scale-normalized errors, but the other (survey) measurement has endogenous errors with arbitrary location and scale. For this...

Bidders' values in discriminatory and uniform-price auctions are not necessarily point-identified under the assumptions of equilibrium bidding and independent private values, but meaningful policy analysis can proceed from bounds on bidder values. This paper provides upper and lower bounds on...

We consider the estimation of a tournament model with moral hazard (based on Rosen (1986), AER)) when only aggregate data on intra-firm employment levels and salaries are available. Equilibrium restrictions of the model allow us to recover parameters of interest, including equilibrium effort...