This paper studies Bertrand price-setting behavior when firms face capacity constraints (Bertrand–Edgeworth game). This game is known to lack equilibria in pure strategies, while the mixed-strategy equilibria are hard to characterize. We explore families of heuristic rules for individual...

We examine a conflictual setting in which adversaries cannot contract on an enforcement variable (arms) and where the future strategic positions of adversaries are very different when there is open conflict than when there is settlement. We show that, as the future becomes more important in this...

In negotiated transactions the act of choosing trading partners and “who chooses” creates a bargaining culture that influences trading behavior. Results are presented from experimental markets in which paired buyers and sellers negotiate the repeated sale of units. Relative to a market...

Commitment problems are inherent to non-binding conflict resolution mechanisms, since an unsatisfied party can ignore the resolution and initiate conflict. We provide experimental evidence suggesting that even in the absence of binding contractual agreements individuals often avoid conflict by...

This study exploits the opening of the experimental lab in Oxford to compare the behavior of students and non-students in a number of classic experimental games, some of which involve other-regarding preferences (Trust Game, Dictator Game, and Public Goods Game) and others which have game forms...

We present a theory of discrete choice with information costs that supports deliberate stochastic choice. We use a unique experimental dataset to distinguish between errors arising from limitations on a decision maker's cognitive abilities and conscious disregard of information. Experimental...

Using online price comparison and shopping platforms makes experiencing slow connections, lags and waiting times for information an unfortunate reality. However, little attention has been paid to analyzing the effects of such delayed display of information on product choice behavior. This...

We conduct a laboratory experiment with a constant-sum sender–receiver game and a sequential game of matching pennies with the same payoff structure to investigate the impact of individuals’ first- and second-order beliefs on truth-telling. While first-movers in matching pennies choose an...

We analyze the prediction of risk preferences of others using an artefactual field experiment with financial professionals and students. For their prediction, the subjects receive information on multiple demographic characteristics and a self-assessment of risk taking of the target. When...

Take-it or leave-it offers are probably as old as mankind. Our objective here is, first, to provide a, probably subjectively colored, recollection of the initial ultimatum game experiment, its motivation and the immediate responses. Second, we discuss extensions of the standard ultimatum...